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Abstract—The Internet of Things (IoT) is an emerging
paradigm that allows a fine-grained and autonomous control of
the surrounding environment. This is achieved through a large
number of devices that collaboratively perform complex tasks.
To date, IoT networks are used in a variety of critical scenarios
and therefore their security has become a primary concern. A
robust technique to enhance the integrity of remote devices is
called Remote Attestation (RA). However, classic RA schemes
require a central and powerful entity, called Verifier, that manages
the entire process of attestation. This makes the entire system
dependent on an external entity and inevitably introduces a single
point of failure.
In our work, we present SAFEd: the first concrete solution
to self-attest autonomous networks of heterogeneous embedded
devices. SAFEd overcomes the limitations of the previous works
by spreading the duties of the Verifier among all the devices in
a scalable way. In our schema, the information needed for the
attestation phase are replicated inside the network, thus raising
the bar to accomplish an attack. As a result, the IoT network
can self-inspect its integrity and self-recover in case of attack,
without the need of an external entity. Our proposal exploits the
security guarantees offered by ARM TrustZone chips to perform
a decentralized attestation protocol based on an enhanced version
of a distributed hash table.
We implemented a prototype of SAFEd for the Raspberry Pi
platform to evaluate the feasibility and the security properties of
our protocol. Moreover, we measured the scalable properties of
SAFEd by using a large network of virtual devices. The results
show that SAFEd can detect infected devices and recover up to
99.7% of its initial status in case of faults or attacks. Moreover,
we managed to protect 50 devices with a logarithmic overhead
on the network and on the devices’ memory.
I. INTRODUCTION
Internet of Things (IoT) refers to a set of new technologies
that allow building sophisticated applications by using groups
of small devices. IoT world revolves around three cardinal
concepts: (i) a decentralized network which can be accessed
remotely through the Internet, (ii) heterogeneous devices that
collaborate autonomously, and (iii) interaction with the physi-
cal environment through sensors and actuators. This approach
has several applications that range from industrial control
systems [29] to small home-appliances [31].
To enhance the security properties of IoT networks, Remote
Attestation (RA) techniques have been proposed. Classic RA
approaches require a trusted entity (i.e., Verifier) that attests
(i.e., verifies) a remote one (i.e., Prover). It is usually assumed
that the Verifier has powerful capabilities and is physically
isolated from the network, thus protected by any threat (e.g., a
remote server in a controlled area); the Prover, instead, might
be any device inside the network and can be tampered by a
potential attacker. During an attestation process, the Verifier
sends a challenge to the Prover and receives a measure of
its status as a report (e.g., an application fingerprint). The
Verifier then compares the measurement with a database of
proofs previously saved to check the correctness of the Prover
status. This approach, often defined as single-verifier RA, is
well-established but needs to be extended to address the novel
challenges offered by IoT networks (heterogeneity, scalability,
dynamicity).
To fill the gap, researchers proposed swarm attestation [8],
[6], [20], [13], [21] as a solution for verifying groups of
heterogeneous devices (swarm) during a single challenge.
These proposals build a spanning tree over the network and
use it to propagate the attestation request and to aggregate
the resulting reports. Also, they assume the presence of a
trusted and powerful Verifier which is placed at the root of the
tree and manages the attestation process. This setting suffers
from four main limitations: (i) the Verifier must be connected
to the swarm, (ii) the Verifier must contain all the proofs,
(iii) the Verifier is a single point of failure inside the system
and (iv) the aggregation process is either producing poor
reports or computationally unfeasible for low-end embedded
devices. Furthermore, a network of embedded devices cannot
be completely autonomous due to the introduction of a central
powerful entity, thus breaking the IoT paradigm. Steps toward
autonomous systems were proposed recently with [2], [19],
[22]. However, [2] relies on heuristics and considers only
homogeneous devices, while [19], [22] do not fully address
scalability and single point-of-failure issues.
In this paper, we propose SAFEd: the first concrete self-
attestation for autonomous networks of heterogeneous embed-
ded devices. SAFEd introduces a completely new approach that
enables a swarm of IoT devices to validate themself without
the need for a central Verifier. Our solution allows to achieve
several desirable properties:
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• No single point of failure: each device inside the network
can be a Verifier, thus increasing the difficulty for an
attacker to corrupt the attestation process.
• Self-protection: the network can identify and react
against corrupted devices.
• Resilient network: the system can recover itself in case
of lost data or attacks.
• Scalability: the protocol can manage a large number of
devices with a minimal footprint.
We achieve the aforementioned goals by extending the con-
cept of Distributed Hash Tables (DHT) [42]. The work here
presented is agnostic from the type of DHT protocol chosen;
in our proof-of-concept, we opted for Chord [34], [35], [41] as
groundwork upon which we built our solution. Every device
is assumed to be equipped with small trusted anchors [24],
which contain and protect the algorithms required to SAFEd.
The paper revolves around the idea of distributing the
proofs over the entire network using a DHT. Periodically,
every device assumes the role of Verifier and challenges a
random Prover to attest its status. Through the DHT, the
devices collaborate to retrieve the original proof and validate
the attestation report. To introduce resiliency, the same network
maintains parallel DHTs (called overlays) through which the
same proofs are replicated in different devices. SAFEd allows
us to handle networks of heterogeneous devices that mount
different applications with different types of proofs. Further-
more, spreading the proofs among all the devices allows us to:
(i) remove the need for a single central authority and (ii) reduce
the memory footprint in every device.
We implemented SAFEd in the open-source Raspberry Pi 3
platform. We opted for this solution because its chip supports
ARM TrustZone [40], which is a standard trusted anchor
largely used in other works [15], [24], [25]. Moreover, we
performed a large-scale experimentation by simulating virtual
devices through Docker containers. We conducted several
attacks against both the platforms, encompassing software
tampering, lost packets and corrupted devices. SAFEd recov-
ered up to 99.7% of lost proofs and successfully protected
50 devices with a logarithmic communication overhead and
memory footprint.
SAFEd overcomes previous attestation solutions for net-
work of IoT devices because its performances are not affected
by the number of devices connected and it completely removes
single point-of-failure by design. Furthermore, solid experi-
mental results are proposed to support our claims. We believe
that SAFEd will help developing more resilient networks of
IoT devices and secure DHTs.
Contributions: To sum up, SAFEd is a novel collabo-
rative attestation for networks of heterogeneous IoT devices.
It introduces new technical solutions to enhance security
guarantees in DHTs with a detailed analysis of performances
and limitations.
The open-source proof-of-concept implementation of
SAFEd for Raspberry Pi 3 will be available at the link 1.
1We are willing to share the source code with the community upon
acceptance or to provide it to the reviewers upon request via conference chairs
Organization: The paper is organized as follow. First,
we describe related works (Section II), introduce the back-
ground concepts (Section III), and discuss the threat model
(Section IV). Then, we describe SAFEd (Section V), illustrate
our proof-of-concept implementation (Section VI), and eval-
uate its performances and security guarantees (Section VII).
Finally, we discuss SAFEd limitations (Section VIII) and
conclude with final remarks (Section IX).
II. RELATED WORK
In this section, we discuss swarm RA (Section II-A) and
DHTs protocols (Section II-B).
A. Swarm Remote Attestation
The first proposal of a cumulative attestation protocol
for swarms of devices was proposed by Asokan et al. with
SEDA [8]. The authors organize the devices in a spanning
tree rooted at the Verifier. The attestation request is initiated by
the Verifier and is forwarded down the tree by each node to its
children; the resulting reports are then aggregated backward up
to the root. This approach achieves a logarithmic complexity
by dividing the burden of propagation and elaboration across
all the devices. The proposal was extended by Ambrosin et al.
with SANA [6]. They use a new schema called Optimistic
Aggregate Signatures for a more efficient aggregation of
reports. A further improvement was introduced by Carpent
et al. with LISA [13], which discusses two new protocols
(LISAα and LISAs) and a new metric to measure the Quality
of Swarm Attestation (QoSA). Overall, SAFEd outperforms
these works for the following reasons: (i) it does not need a
central Verifier to attest the network; (ii) it can handle timeouts
during communication; (iii) it can handle losses by using
parallel DHTs; (iv) it provides a fine-grain report for each
device with low overhead; (v) it keeps security guarantees in
presence of compromised nodes.
Previous works ruled out the detection of physical attacks.
This limitation was resolved by Ahmad et al. who proposed
DARPA [20]. They notice that a physical attack requires an
adversary to remove a device from the network, thus causing a
temporary disconnection. Therefore, they introduce a heartbeat
protocol to synchronize all the devices so that losing a single
heartbeat would raise an alarm. Kohnha¨user et al. improved
physical-attack detection by introducing SCAPI [21]. This
solution reduces the communication complexity of DARPA,
identifies compromised devices and supports highly dynamic
and partitioned network topologies. Both [21], [20] are con-
ceived as an extension for the other swarm attestation works
and therefore they are not included by design inside the system.
SAFEd, instead, detects physical tampering by tracking the
communication timeouts during the protocol execution.
Abera et al. proposed DIAT [2], which is an attestation
schema for autonomous systems. In that work, the authors
assume a network of homogeneous devices (e.g., a swarm of
drones), which validate their own status without using a central
Verifier. However, their approach is based on heuristics and
requires a network of similar devices. On the contrary, SAFEd
is based on analytical results and it can handle networks of
heterogeneous devices in an autonomous fashion.
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PASTA [22] is the first work that tries to spread the
burden of verification across the entire network. In PASTA,
the Provers periodically collaborate to generate the so-called
tokens. Every token attests the integrity of all the nodes
that participated in its generation and contains a timestamp
to allow absence detection of a particular node. Tokens are
validated using an aggregated signature based on a Schnorr-
based multisignature scheme. Ibrahim et al. proposed US-
AID [19] which combines continuous in-network attestation
and Proofs-of-non-Absence to detect both software tampering
and device disconnections. In order to achieve physical attacks
detection, the previous protocols require a reliable read-only
clock (RROC) in each device that should be loosely synchro-
nized along the network. Moreover, their memory fingerprints
depend on variables with uncertain values. SAFEd, instead, can
detect physical attacks directly using communication timeouts
and has a predictable memory usage.
To sum up, SAFEd overcomes previous related RA
schemas for mainly four reasons: (i) we fully remove any
central trusted authority in the network, (ii) we efficiently
spread the proofs among the nodes, (iii) we produce fine–
grained reports of the devices’ status, (iv) we do not rely on
synchronized clocks for absence detection.
B. Distributed Hash Tables
In general, all DHTs have been designed to decentralize
information (e.g., a file) and improve network performances
and robustness. Furthermore, they are thought to be deployed
in large networks, such as the Internet. However, these pro-
tocols do not consider security issues in their design. In
the last years, researchers investigated security limitations of
DHTs [23], [30], [17], [32]. These works aim at improving
different aspects of DHT protocols, however, they differ from
SAFEd for different reasons:
• Context: they assume a large and dynamic network such
as the Internet, while we focus on a more restricted
physical area.
• Attacker model: they assume dishonest or churn nodes,
while we improve trust in the nodes thanks to our security
mechanisms.
• Defense strategies: they rely on statistical and crypto-
graphic schema to improve trust in nodes [4]. However,
their approaches simply increase the effort required to
a potential attacker without resolving the problem by
design.
We are the first to tackle DHT security issues in the context
of attestation protocols, which is more concrete and practical
w.r.t. previous works.
Another crucial aspect of DHTs regards the privacy of the
data stored inside of it [27], [36]. SAFEd enhances the privacy
constraint by entirely encrypting the traffic and protecting the
sensitive memory locations inside every device.
To sum up, SAFEd improves DHT security guarantees by
exploiting trusted computing for specific scenarios (i.e., IoT).
Also, we believe that our solutions can be adopted to mitigate
similar threats in more general scenarios.
III. BACKGROUND
In this section, we provide the background knowledge
needed for SAFEd. We introduce RA procedures (Sec-
tion III-A), trusted computing technologies (Section III-B), and
Chord protocol (Section III-C).
A. Remote Attestation
Remote Attestation (RA) schema refers to those protocols
that allow verifying the integrity of a remote entity. Usually,
they involve two distinct roles: Verifier and Prover. The Verifier
is considered trusted and is usually physically protected from
attacks (e.g., a remote server). Its duty is to verify the integrity
of a Prover that may be corrupted (e.g., due to a malware). RA
schemes require a Verifier to start the protocol by sending a
challenge to the Prover, which measures some properties of its
state (e.g., compute a hash of a piece of software) and returns
a report. The Verifier is now able to validate the Prover status
according to the returned report by comparing its value with
a database of correct measurements (called proofs).
The classic approach involves static measurements, such
as software fingerprint or hardware integrity [16]. More re-
cently, researchers proposed a dynamic type of RA defined
dynamic [1], [2], [38], which tries to attest run-time properties
such execution-paths. SAFEd focuses on static RA. However,
we discuss possible dynamic RA integration strategies in
Section VIII.
B. Trusted Anchor
Modern RA schema requires devices to mount specialized
hardware called trusted anchors. These technologies allow to
define protected memory regions and build Trusted Execution
Environments (TEE). A TEE provides secure functionalities
such as secure cryptographic algorithms and secure random
number generators. In this work, we employed TrustZone [40]
as trusted anchor because it provides advanced features such
as dynamic memory allocation. A device equipped with TEE
organizes its memory in two main zones: trusted and untrusted,
respectively known in ARM TrustZone jargon as secure world
and normal world. The normal world, as the name suggests,
contains the general purpose software needed for running a
classic operating system. The secure world, instead, contains
the code strictly necessary for establishing a trusted execution
inside the normal world, i.e., the secure world checks the
execution of the normal world.
SAFEd implementation is placed inside the secure world to
protect its algorithms and critical variables (e.g., cryptographic
keys). We opted for ARM TrustZone for our proof-of-concept
implementation due to its flexibility and its wide spread. These
technologies stand as the base of modern RA schema in IoT
devices and classic IT infrastructure.
C. Chord
Chord [34], [35] is a lookup protocol to establish a DHT
and is specifically designed for large peer-to-peer networks. It
uses consistent hashing for handling positions of nodes and
data within the network, i.e., , each element of the network is
identified by an m-bit identifier computed by a hash function.
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The nodes are arranged around a circle module 2m. Every
piece of data is saved inside the first node whose identifier is
greater than or equal to its identifier. As a consequence of this
setting, a device will store all the piece of data whose ID is
between its ID and that of the preceding device. Each node
is linked to its predecessor and successor, thus establishing a
ring. To improve resilience, a device also maintains a list of
immediate successors, called successors list.
Having the devices and data organized in a ring makes
possible to implement a look up function as follows: (i) device
A sends a request with the data ID to its successor B, (ii) if B
contains the data (i.e., ID < B), it is returned to A, otherwise
it forwards the request to its successor. The step is repeated
till finding the ID.
The complexity of this solution is linear with the number
of nodes placed inside the ring. To improve the performances,
Chord introduces a finger table that contains additional routing
information. The finger table has m entries called fingers:
the i-th finger is a reference to the 2i−1 position ahead
the current node. As a result, the finger table allows an
average searching complexity of O(log2N), making the look
up operation scalable with respect to the number of nodes N .
Chord also provides procedures for adding new nodes to the
ring and maintaining the order in case of failures. We referred
to [41] for the implementation of a simpler yet correct version
based on three distinct operations:
• Join: the outside node contacts a member of the ring
(defined as the entry) to know which is its successor. It
then contacts its successor to update the successor list.
• Stabilize: the node asks to its successor information about
the predecessor. It adopts this predecessor as its new
successor if it is actually closer than the current successor
in the ring order. In both cases, the node sends a final
notification to the successor. The successors list is updated
with the information coming from the contacted nodes.
• Rectify: in case of a received notification, the node checks
if its current predecessor is still alive and then adopts the
notifying member as new predecessor if it is closer than
the current predecessor or if it has no live predecessor.
A node executes the join procedure just when entering the net-
work. Stabilize and rectify procedures are instead periodically
triggered during the protocol routine.
SAFEd builds on top of an enhanced version of Chord, in
which a joining node can save its attestation data inside the
network and the routine operations take care of re-distributing
the information when new nodes join the ring. More im-
portantly, SAFEd introduces redundancy of data by running
several Chord instances at the same time, thus dealing with
the loss of information caused by failures or attacks.
IV. ASSUMPTIONS AND THREAT MODEL
In this section, we introduce some preliminaries regarding
devices architecture (Section IV-A), network context (Sec-
tion IV-B) and threat model (Section IV-C).
A. Device Architecture
The devices considered in SAFEd are equipped with a
trusted anchor (i.e., ARM TrustZone), which is considered
secure. The secure world is physically isolated from the rest
of the system and its duties are twofold: (i) inspect and
measure the device memory and (ii) communicate with the
other trusted anchors in the network. The trusted anchor is used
as a secure storage for all the variables needed by SAFEd and
it is protected from an attacker by design. The normal world
runs different applications and can be compromised.
B. Network Context
In this work, we assume networks of fully interconnected
devices that range from few elements (around 10) to some
hundreds. Our main use case is for industry, however, we can
deploy SAFEd to any type of autonomous system networks.
SAFEd can handle highly dynamic networks where nodes
continuously enter and exit them. However, we allow only
known devices to join the network. This is reasonable since
we consider geographically restricted networks (e.g., factories
or smart-homes).
C. Threat Model
SAFEd faces attacks that target both the device and the
network.
Device Attacks: The goal of the attacker is to load
unauthorized binaries or inject malicious code inside the nor-
mal world by using different strategies, e.g., exploiting security
flaws. We consider the secure world isolated from the normal
one and therefore out of the attacker range. We also consider
compromised devices that hide their presence in the network
and physical attacks.
Network Attacks: An attacker can manipulate network
traffic by following classic Dolev-Yao model [14], thus she
can eavesdrop, insert, modify and delete messages exchanged,
perform a replay attack or forge attestation messages.
In general, we do not consider denial-of-service (DoS),
however we evaluate the resilience of SAFEd in case of
unavailable devices. These assumptions are coherent with
previous works [8], [6], [13], [2], [19], [22].
V. SAFEd
SAFEd protocol relies on a DHT to store and spread the
proofs throughout the network. However, the DHT protocols
proposed till now are not designed to face many of the security
issues arising during an attestation process. Therefore, our
protocol introduces novel solutions to achieve the following
requirements:
• Availability: all the proofs have to be available during the
attestation phase even in case of faults or attacks.
• Integrity and confidentiality: the attacker cannot observe
or be able to modify the proofs.
• Scalability: the proofs must be equally spread across the
network and retrievable in a scalable time.
• Proofs location opacity: an attacker should not be able
to locate the positions of the proofs inside the network.
In the rest of the section, we provide a system overview
(Section V-A). We show the encryption schema adopted (Sec-
tion V-B) and the protocol itself (Section V-C). We discuss the
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Fig. 1: Network architecture (considering a single overlay).
challenges faced (Section V-D and Section V-E) and at last we
describe the attestation task (Section V-F).
A. Overview
We consider two logical parallel networks (Figure 1). The
first one is the normal network (dashed line), used by ordinary
applications to communicate with other devices. The second
one is SAFEd-net (solid-line arrows), built on top of the
normal network and used by the trusted anchors to perform
the protocol routines.
SAFEd-net is an extension of Chord algorithm (Sec-
tion III-C) where the devices participate in multiple DHTs
instances, called overlays. Each overlay is composed by all
the network devices and contains exactly one copy of each
proof. The purpose of the overlays is twofold: (i) the number
of overlays identifies the redundancy (i.e., X independent proof
copies requires X overlays) and (ii) the number of overlays
helps keeping the proofs distribution balanced.
The location of objects inside SAFEd is managed through
two types of ID:
• Overlay ID (OID): identifies a device inside an overlay.
Therefore, a device has a different OID for each overlay.
• Unique ID (UID): identifies a proof of a device. It is the
same for all the overlays.
We can explain the usage of these IDs by means of an
example. Assume SAFEd has two overlays. Therefore, we
assign three IDs to a device D, namely DOID1 , DOID2 , and
DUID. The first two (i.e., DOID1 and DOID2 ) identify the
position of D inside the two overlays respectively. The last
one (i.e., DUID) identifies the position of its proof in each
overlay. The OIDs are computed online when the device enters
the network. In Section V-B, we describe the OID creation
process that makes them random and applicable as public
keys in a secure communication protocol. The UID, instead,
is computed offline and is used as the key for retrieving the
proof from the various overlays during an attestation process.
We indicate UID and proof as a key/value pair (UID, proof).
The motivation behind our design choice is that in this way
an attacker does not know the order of the devices around the
ring. As a result, even if the UID is predictable, an external
attacker cannot foresee which device contains the proof linked
with it.
B. Secure Device Communication
SAFEd introduces a novel protocol schema that allows
two devices to share a symmetric key K with zero-message
exchanged. Our approach overcomes previous ones [19], [22]
that either requires a device to store every key needed for
the communication or to execute a key exchange protocol to
establish a secure channel. The schema is based on Diffie
Hellman [33] and exploits Chord protocol properties. The idea
is that each OID represents the public key of a device that
joined an overlay. In Section V-D, we discuss our mechanism
to allow only authorized devices to enter the network.
In our protocol, we assume that all the devices share two
secure prime number g and N . During the join phase, a device
randomly computes an OID as follows:
X = rand() (modulo N),
OID = (gX) (modulo N).
At first, a device randomly computes a number X (modulo
N ), which is kept secret within the trusted anchor. Then, it
generates the OID by computing the exponentiation of X over
g (modulo N ). These two operations are repeated for each
overlay. For the sake of simplicity, we continue the description
considering a single overlay, however it is possible to easily
extend the approach to any number of overlays. We indicate
the pair X , OID for a device D as follows:
(DX , DOID).
Two devices, namely A and B, that know the respective OIDs
can compute a shared symmetric key KAB as follows:
KAB = (AOID)
BX = (gAX )
BX
KAB = (g
BX )AX = (BOID)
AX (modulo N).
The key KAB can now be used in a symmetric encryption
schema E.
The design of Chord assures that each device knows
the OIDs of its successors (e.g., finger list and successor
list). Therefore, if B is a device following A, B cannot
compute KAB because it does not have knowledge of AOID. To
overcome this problem, we need to send AOID to B avoiding
unauthorized entities to read the OID. We achieve this by
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Fig. 2: SAFEd point-to-point communication protocol.
encrypting AOID such that only authorized devices can read
it. The whole message structure is shown in the following:
EBOID [SOID||AOID] || EKAB [M ] || O,
which comprises three parts:
• EBOID [SOID||AOID] is the header and is encrypted by using
a symmetric encryption schema E and BOID as a key 2.
This allows only the devices that are already participating
the overlay (i.e., B) to read the content. The header
contains two OIDs, called source and sender. The first
identifies the device which originally sent the message
(i.e., SOID), while the second identifies the device which
is currently forwarding the message to B (i.e., AOID).
Keeping the source OID permits a fast reply; this will be
described later through an example.
• EKAB [M ] is the message body. It contains the message
M to deliver and is encrypted with the symmetric schema
E and KAB as a key.
• O indicates the overlay to which the message is meant to
and is sent as plain text.
This structure enables B to decrypt an incoming message as
follow:
• reads O and identify from which overlay is coming.
• uses the corresponding OID (i.e., BOID) to decrypt the
header and to retrieve the sender OID (e.g., AOID).
• compute KAB and decrypt M .
A packet structured in such way has three interesting prop-
erties: (i) besides the overlay O, no information is shipped as a
plain text, thus only Member devices can read the headers (see
Section V-D); (ii) only the intended recipient can successfully
decrypt the message, thus any attempt to manipulate or reroute
the message will generate an error; (iii) a symmetric schema
is less expensive than an asymmetric one, thus more suitable
for low-power devices. Figure 2 shows a complete example of
two devices that communicate. In this case, device A wants
to send a message M to device C, but C is not directly
reachable by A. Therefore, A must pass through the ring. At
the beginning, A only knows the OID of B, because it is its
successor. Therefore, A asks B to deliver M to C by creating
packet (1) as follows:
EBOID [AOID||AOID] || EKAB [M ] || O.
In this packet, source and sender OID coincide with AOID. B
decrypts the header with its OID, calculates KAB using the
2Since the key space of E is generally smaller than the size of BOID, we
use a hash function H to adjust the size, i.e., EH(BOID)[.]
sender OID and obtains the message M . Since B knows C,
B relays the message crafted as follows:
ECOID [AOID||BOID] || EKBC [M ] || O.
C follows similar steps to retrieve message M and serves the
request. At this point, C replies to A by using the source OID
(i.e., AOID) and crafting message (3) as follows:
EAOID [AOID||COID] || EKCA [M ] || O.
Finally, A receives the response from C.
This approach brings three advantages: (i) we avoid spoof-
ing attacks because the sender is automatically verified (unless
the attacker stoles its secret X), (ii) we can build a symmetric
key without using extra messages, and (iii) a compromised
device cannot choose its OIDs arbitrarily unless it resolves
the discrete algorithm. We also mitigate reply attacks by using
nonces [43].
C. Protocol
Figure 3 shows SAFEd protocol as a finite-state-machine.
Each shape represents a device status, while the arrows repre-
sent the transaction from a status to the next one. Since this is
an extension to the original Chord protocol, additional status
are represented as squares and new phases are written with
bold underlined text. Each of them is explained in dedicated
subsections:
• Device-setting defines the initial device configuration.
• Device-unknown and Certification allow only recognized
devices to join the network (Section V-D).
• Non-member and Proofs update are used to enhance
availability of data in our dynamic context (Section V-E).
• Attestation is used to monitor the integrity of other
devices inside the network (Section V-F).
As a whole, SAFEd protocol is composed by two distinct
phases: Offline and Online.
During the Offline phase, we boot the devices and set the
following parameters inside the trusted anchor:
• The pair (UID, proof), which will be saved inside the
network and later used for attestation/verification.
• A public/private key pair which are signed by a certifica-
tion authority (CA).
• The CA certificate for the key pair.
During the Online phase, a device in Device-unknown
status connects to the network and starts the procedure to
join SAFEd-net. We introduced this phase because Chord does
not handle authentication by default. After the Certification
is done, a device enters the Device-certified status and it can
join each overlay asynchronously. A device that does not pass
the Certification cannot physically communicate with other
devices because it does not receive any OIDs from the entry
point. The following procedure is repeated for every overlay.
During the join phase, a device finds its successor around the
ring by following standard Chord algorithms. It then sends its
pair (UID, proof) to be stored. After this task is completed,
the device assumes a Non-member status, which means that:
(i) the device is aware of its position around the ring, (ii) it
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Fig. 3: SAFEd finite-state-machine. Addition of states and phases w.r.t. Chord are respectively shown with squares and bold
underlined text.
has inserted its own proof inside the overlay and (iii) it has
not received yet the proofs it has to store. At this point,
the device performs its first stabilize operation, making its
successor aware of its presence inside the overlay. This triggers
the Proofs update, which consists in the successor sending a
copy of the proofs that should be stored inside the new device.
A node maintains Non-member status until it is completely
integrated inside the ring, i.e., the preceding and following
devices becomes aware of it. When this is the case, it has
become officially part of the overlay and it can switch to the
Member status. This allows the device to perform the Rectify
operation as described in the original Chord protocol and
permits to the successor to safely delete the proofs previously
copied. It is fundamental to maintain different Member status
for each overlay because the Attestation process involves
all the overlays. Therefore, we require a device to become
Member in all of them before being able to execute it, thus
reaching Member-and-Running status.
D. Certification Phase
This phase allows an entry point N to recognize the
identity of a device U , which is in Device-unknown status, by
using a public key infrastructure (PKI). Figure 4 describes the
protocol. All the devices are initialized during the Offline phase
and receive a private key (e.g., NPRV) and the corresponding
certificate (e.g., NCERT), signed by a certification authority
(CA). The procedure uses a generic asymmetric encryption
schema denoted as E.
The protocol starts with U that generates a nonce r and
U N
r ←Nonce() UCERT||r
Verif(UCERT)
ENPRV [EUPUB [NOID||r]] || NCERT
Verif(NCERT)
[NOID], r
′ ← Ext()
Check(r, r′)
[UOID]← Gen()
U ← device-certified
join overlay 1
. . .
join overlay N
Fig. 4: Certification phase between an unknown device U and
the entry point N .
sends it along with its certificate (i.e., UCERT||r) to N . After
N correctly verifies the signature of UCERT, it encrypts all
of its OIDs and the nonce r (i.e., [NOID||r]) by first using
the public key of U (i.e., UPUB) and then its private key
(i.e., NPRV). Finally, N sends them back to U along with its
certificate (i.e., NCERT). At this point, U performs the following
operations: (i) verifies the certificate of N (i.e., NCERT) using
the CA public key, (ii) verifies the public key of N using the
certificate and removes first encryption with it, (iii) extracts
the OIDs of N (i.e., [NOID]) and nonce (i.e., r′) using its own
private key, (iv) checks the nonce r and r′ to avoid replay
attacks, (v) generates its own OIDs (i.e., [UOID]), and (vi) sets
its status to Device-certified. The double encription guarantees
two properties: (i) the public key of U ensures that only U can
decrypt the message and, (ii) the private key of N ensures that
the message has been sent by N . From this point ahead, U
can communicate with the entry point by using the encryption
schema described in Section V-B. More precisely, U joins the
overlays as described in Chord. A device that does not pass the
Certification phase cannot receive the OIDs of the entry point,
and therefore, it cannot communicate with the other devices.
To protect from the leakage of the private key during physical
attacks, it is fundamental to implement a certificate revocation
procedure. We discuss possible solutions in Section VIII.
E. Multiple Device Entrance
We designed Non-member status and Proof update task
to handle the entrance of group of devices while keeping the
proofs available. Figure 5 shows the main four steps of Proof
update, that begins when a new device C enters in an overlay.
The rectangle before the node letter is a representation of the
proofs stored inside of it. In step 1, we assume having two
devices A and B correctly distributed around the overlay (i.e.,
AOID < BOID). In step 2, C has just joined and it has found
its position between A and B (i.e., AOID < COID < BOID). In
this step, C is in Non-member status and it can only perform
stabilize. This allows us to handle the entrance of multiple
devices simultaneously and will be described later. In step 3,
B copies into C the relative proofs while keeping a temporary
copy in B itself. Keeping a copy of the proofs into B enables
the other devices to find the C proofs even though C has
not entered the ring yet. In step 4, A performs rectify and
inserts C as its successor. C is formally part of the overlay
and consequently it can shift to Member status, while B can
delete its leftover proofs. After step 4, C starts performing
rectify. When C becomes Member in all the overlays, it reaches
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A B
1
2
3
C
B copy proofs into C
C  becomes member 
and B deletes its proofs
A
A
B
BC
4
CA B
C finds its position
Proofs contained in B
Fig. 5: Main steps of a new device that enters the overlay. The
device remains Non-member until its neighbours in the overlay
become aware of it, i.e., it becomes Member of the overlay.
Member-and-running status and starts performing/receiving
attestations.
This approach allows us to handle group of devices that
enter simultaneously. For instance, a new device D may
attempt entering while C is still a Non-member. Here, we
distinguish two cases: (i) D is located between A and C (i.e.,
AOID < DOID < COID) and sets C as successor ; (ii) D is
located between C and B (i.e., COID < DOID < BOID) and
sets B as successor. In both cases, D is kept as Non-member
until its successor becomes Member as well. The difference is
just in the order in which the devices become Member. In case
(i), D receives Member status from C, therefore, the entrance
order is C, then D. In case (ii), D receives Member status
from B, while C changes its successor to D after doing a
stabilize to B. Generally, Member status is assigned only by
other Member (or Member-and-running) devices, which are
considered stable. We keep rectify disabled while a device is
Non-member to avoid the formation of chains of devices that
would cause some of them to have outdated list of proofs.
F. Attestation Protocol
SAFEd attestation process is an extension of classic RA
(Section III-A). The main differences are essentially two:
(i) we consider all devices both Prover and Verifier, and
(ii) the proofs are spread among all devices. The entire
attestation process is implemented in a dedicated phase, which
is routinely executed by any device inside the network. In our
implementation, the task is triggered by a function located
inside the normal world. This is necessary because TrustZone
secure OS is passive and needs to be called from outside the
secure world. However, this does not affect the efficacy of
the protocol because an attacker cannot disable the attestation
trigger without being detected by other participants in the
protocol. The attestation is composed as follows:
• Verifier election: when the attestation is triggered, the
device elects itself as Verifier.
• Prover election: the device generates a random OIDR in
a random overlay. The successor of OIDR is elected as
Prover.
• Attestation request: the Verifier sends a challenge to the
Prover passing through the ring.
• Retrieve report: the Prover measures itself and returns a
report defined as (UID,HASH) to the Verifier. The UID
is used to retrieve the proofs from the overlays, while the
HASH is the current self-measure of the Prover, which
can be corrupted.
• Retrieve proofs: the Verifier queries all overlays to
retrieve the proofs using the received UID. The proofs
will be used to control the report.
• Voting: we use a First Past The Post (FTPT) voting
schema [3] to decide the healthy status of the Prover.
In case of compromised status, the Verifier reacts in a
proper way (see Attack Reaction below).
• Recovery: in case of missing proofs, the Verifier uses the
retrieved data to recover the information where it has been
lost. In case no overlay returned the proof, the Verifier
launches a warning of possible infection for that particular
device.
Voting: FTPT is a plurality voting system that elects
the most voted choice as the winner. During the voting phase,
the Verifier considers the proofs collected from the various
overlays as a preference vote, i.e., which state each overlay
thinks is the correct one. At first, the Verifier evaluates all the
missing proofs as blank votes and it does not consider them in
the counting. Then, the Verifier chooses the correct proof by
picking the one that was returned the highest number of times.
The elected proof is then used to verify the report sent by the
Prover. The devices whose vote disagreed with the elected
proof are considered infected as well.
Despite its simplicity, FTPT shows in our case resilience
against manipulation. An attacker cannot foresee the location
of the proofs in the network. As a result, the voting is robust till
at least 50% devices are healthy. Due to the design of SAFEd,
we can easily implement new type of voting schema.
Attack Reaction: The actual attack reaction strategy
strictly depends by the network pursue. In our prototype, we
isolate the corrupted devices. In other scenarios, for instance,
we can implement an hard-reset of the device. This can be
useful for malware such as Mirai [7]. It is also possible to
save the attestation results in the overlays for future manual
inspections.
VI. IMPLEMENTATION
Figure 6 shows the architecture adopted for the platform
Raspberry Pi 3. We developed our prototype on top of OP-
TEE [26] 3 and wrote it using C language. Since we designed
SAFEd to exploit ARM TrustZone features (Section III-B),
we split SAFEd into two components: untrusted and trusted
application. The untrusted application interacts with the pe-
ripherals, while the trusted application contains SAFEd code
and the private information. The network communication is
implemented through a TCP client and server socket in the
normal world 4. SAFEd workflow is composed by a number
of independent steps, which are depicted in Figure 6. In the
3We used the commit f5172a4aa993f644d0edb3a64a49938fd2e6
f906 and 28eea17f4dba5bbf7848926eb031ba660e8856f0 of the
official repository for the OP-TEE OS and client respectively.
4We could have implemented a socket in the secure world as well, however,
not all trusted anchor platforms support this feature so we opted for a more
flexible solution.
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Fig. 6: Execution pipeline.
beginning, SAFEd waits for an incoming packet from the
server socket (step 1). Once a packet arrives, it is sent into
the trusted application (step 2). At this point, the packet is
decrypted (step 3) and processed (step 4). After the response
is created, it is encrypted (step 5) and written into the untrusted
application along with the destination IP (step 6), which must
be in plain text for correct routing. Finally, the packet is
shipped by the client socket (step 7). The packets are built
in such a way that the untrusted application knows only
the destination IP, while the content is always encrypted as
described in Section V-B. An attacker that alters the plain-text
IP would simply lead to a trashed or lost message because the
only device capable of decrypting it is the intended recipient
(see Section V-B). Moreover, blocking the message would
cause the original sender to raise a warning for a timeout in
its communications, thus exposing the attack.
Our prototype requires around 46KLoC for the untrusted
application and around 49KLoC for the trusted application. We
used AES-CBC [37] for symmetric encryption with keys 32B
long, while we used RSA [10] for the asymmetric keys in the
certification phase with 1218B for the private key and 294B
for the public one.
Availability Issues and Mitigation: We mitigate trusted
anchors availability issues by blinding the operations of the
trusted application. This is achieved as follows: (i) the trusted
application exposes a single entry point (i.e., a single func-
tion to invoke); (ii) the trusted application randomly decides
the operation to perform only when it is inside the secure
world. This means that the normal world can only invoke the
trusted application without knowing what is happening inside.
Therefore, an attacker cannot interrupt a single action (e.g.,
the attestation request) without blocking the entire applica-
tion. Although this approach requires always having pending
packets to process, this is not a real problem because the
devices continuously exchange packets. Therefore, an attacker
is encouraged to activate the trusted anchor to avoid detection.
Measurement Generation: SAFEd protects the in-
tegrity of critical pieces of software inside the normal world by
using a shared memory. The location to protect is identified at
the boot phase. For the sake of simplicity, our proof-of-concept
can monitor memory regions that reside in the same process of
SAFEd. It is still possible to extend SAFEd to read arbitrary
physical addresses and protect the integrity of different parts
of the system [39].
Docker Porting: We ported our prototype implementa-
tion into Docker containers to perform large scale performance
analysis, while the strict security analysis was conducted on
the Raspberry PIs’ network. We implemented the porting by
moving the trusted application in a standard user-space, while
the rest remained unchanged. In this case, we used the standard
Ubuntu image for Docker containers as a base.
VII. EVALUATION
In this section, we evaluate different metrics of SAFEd.
First, we measure the network overhead (Section VII-A) and
memory footprint (Section VII-B). Then, we measure how
the proofs get distributed among the devices (Section VII-C)
and the resilience of the network in the presence of attacks
(Section VII-D). Finally, we discuss SAFEd security properties
(Section VII-E).
Network Settings: Before we describe the experiments
and the relative results we illustrate the networks settings used
for our experiments.
• Raspberry Pi: we mounted a small network of Raspberry
Pi 3 composed by 4 devices. This setting was used
to measure the performances of SAFEd with different
combination of overlays and a fixed number of devices.
Moreover, the Raspberry Pis was useful to prove the
protocol claims on real devices.
• Docker: we mounted a virtual network composed by
various number of Docker containers (from 10 to 50),
each of them representing a device. We used this setting to
measure the performances of SAFEd with larger number
of devices and a fixed number of overlays.
A. Network Overhead
We measure the network overhead introduced by SAFEd
in terms of global messages exchanged and messages process
time.
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(a) Number of messages per second. (b) Average finger table size.
(c) Resilience. (d) Random source distribution.
Fig. 7: Network overhead, finger table size, resilience measurements and proofs distribution of SAFEd prototype.
Global Messages Exchanged.: Figure 7a shows the
average number of messages exchanged per second (i.e.,
msg/sec) with different network settings. In our implementa-
tion, we handle two types of message:
• Certification messages: they are used only during the
certification phase (Section V-D) and require 256 × o
bytes, where o is the number of overlays (e.g., 1KB for
4 overlays). These messages are more expensive in terms
of size but they are only used during the Certification
Phase.
• Routine messages: the other messages exchanged in our
prototype have a fixed size of 384 bytes plus 68 × s
bytes, where s is the successor list size (e.g., 520B
with 2 successors). They compose the vast majority of
the network communication. Furthermore, s is a fixed
parameter of the network, thus the message size remains
constant throughout the execution.
We measured the messages exchanged by tuning two prop-
erties. We varied the number of overlays from 2 to 8 on
the Raspberry Pi network (dotted line), while we varied the
number of devices from 10 to 50 on the Docker network
(solid line). The results from the Raspberry Pi network show
a linear growth of the number of messages with the increase
of the overlays. We measured around 2.5 msg/sec by using
4 devices and 2 overlays, till reaching around 9 msg/sec by
using 4 devices an 8 overlays. This result is intuitive because
each overlay works independently, and therefore, they require
a separate set of messages for their operations. A different
behavior is, instead, observed for the Docker network, that
shows a logarithmic growth of the number of messages with
the increase of the devices. In this case, we measured up to
2msg/sec on average with 50 devices and a single overlay. This
pattern is a consequence of Chord algorithm, which scales well
in terms of network size.
To sum up, the network overhead introduced by SAFEd
scales logarithmically with the number of devices. Previous
works [19], [22] do not propose an analysis for the net-
work overhead. However, the security of their communication
channels relies on the prior execution of a key exchange
protocol between each pair of devices that needs to exchange
data. Considering that a device needs to communicate with
every neighbour, we can infer that the overall complexity for
the network is at least quadratic on the average number of
neighbour a device has inside the network.
Message Time Elapsed: We measure the time required
to process a single message in a Raspberry Pi. We did not
considered the Certification messages phase because they are
used only during the initial part of the protocol. We also
ignored Docker containers performances because we focus on
real device scenarios. As a result, any message required on
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average 9.1ms (with a standard deviation of 6.3) to be pro-
cessed without using cryptography, while around the double,
18ms (with a standard deviation of 9.2), using the cryptography
described in Section V-B. As already observed in [19], [22],
the cryptography is the predominant part during the protocol
execution.
B. Memory Footprint
Each device uses 64, 1218, 294 and 256 bytes respectively
for the UID, the private RSA key, the public RSA key and the
certificate. For each overlay, it uses 32 bytes for the secret,
68 bytes for its own OID and its predecessor OID, 68 bytes
for each entry in the successor list, 68 bytes for the entries in
the finger list and 128 bytes for each element inside the proof
storage. The overall memory usage M , expressed in bytes, can
be computed as follows:
M = 1832 + [168 + 68× s+ 68× f + 128× p]× o,
where s is the size of the successor list, f is the size of the
finger table, p is the number of proofs and o the number of
overlays. The size of the successor list s is a fixed parameter
that remains constant during the protocol execution. The finger
list size f , instead, has an upper bound of log(n), with n the
total number of devices inside the network. In Figure 7b, we
support the previous claim analyzing the finger table size in
both Raspberry Pi (dashed line) and Docker (solid line) net-
works. This table is used by Chord to optimize packets routing
(see Section III-C). Each overlay maintains a separate table,
and their entries represent other devices in the same overlay.
Similarly to the global message exchanged, we observe two
patterns. For the Raspberry Pi network, the finger table grows
linearly. It ranges from around 0.3KB, for 4 devices and 2
overlays, to around 1.2KB, for 4 devices and 8 overlays. This
pattern is linear because each device maintains a separate table
for each overlay. On the other hand, the Docker network’s size
grows logarithmically reaching up to 0.3KB, for 50 devices
and a single overlay. This is because the finger table by design
contains at most a logarithmic number of entries with respect
to the network size.
To sum up, the space required for each device till now
is scalable because it requires an amount of memory which is
logarithmic with the number of devices. In the next paragraph,
we will discuss the number of proofs p that a device is expected
to store.
C. Proofs Spreading
We analyze the proofs distribution in a network from two
perspectives: at first, we discuss the proofs distribution in
presence of a single overlay; then, we analyze the case with
smaller networks and multiple overlays.
Figure 7d shows an analysis of the proofs distribution in
a single overlay. To calculate the distribution, we considered
the distances between each pair of consecutive proofs. The
normalized distance is shown in the y-axis of the plot, while
the x-axis shows the number of proofs present inside the
overlay. To give a comprehensive view, we propose four
different curves: (i) the ideal distance as a thin-dashed line,
(ii) the minimum distance as a dot-dashed line, (iii) the average
distance as a solid line, and (iv) the maximum distance as
a bold-dashed line. We observe that the average normalized
distance remains close to the ideal case, while the maximum
normalized distance converges towards it. At 50 proofs, the
overlay reaches an average distance of 5% with a maximum
distance of 10%. The trend shows that a more crowded overlay
brings to a more uniform distribution of proofs. This is due
to the location of both devices and proofs that is regulated
by random identifier, i.e., OIDs and UIDs. In fact, a random
process is supposed to generate a roughly uniform distribution
after enough extractions, that we empirically estimated being
around 50 proofs.
Having independent and random proofs helps obtaining a
uniform distribution for smaller networks (e.g., 10 devices)
by tuning the number of overlays. Each overlay is indeed
completely independent from the others. Thus, we can consider
the nodes that populate a particular overlay as separate entities
from the others. This means that, in case of networks with
10 devices, we can balance the distribution of the proofs by
setting 5 overlays. In this way, we reach a population of 50
independent entities.
To sum up, the number of proofs p that a device stores
is bounded and can be forced to reach the ideal value (i.e., 1
proofs for each overlay) even in small networks. Considering
the overall memory consumption, SAFEd is a clear improve-
ment with respect to previous works that are either an order of
magnitude more expensive [22] or have a quadratic dependence
on unpredictable parameters [19].
D. Resilience
The purpose of this experiment is to measure the ability
of SAFEd of recovering missing proofs in case of attacks or
faults. We performed this measurement using the Raspberry
Pi network. Furthermore, we modeled a powerful attacker that
randomly destroys all the proofs of a device. This attack is
tuned by a drop rate which indicates the probability of a device
to erase its own proofs on all overlays. For instance, a drop
rate of 5% means that each device will randomly erase its own
proofs during 5 operations out of 100 on average. We tested
different combination of drop rate and number of overlays to
observe the different responses.
Figure 7c shows the results of our experiments. We varied
the drop rate from 5% to 30%, which means that in the worst
case each device removed all of its own proofs one out of three
operations. The overlays, instead, ranged from 2 to 8. The y-
axis shows the resilience index, which is the ratio between
the number of proofs correctly recovered and the number of
non-retrieved proofs. According to the attestation algorithm
(Section V-F), in case of non-retrieved proofs, the Verifier
attempts to recover the missing information from the other
overlays. Therefore, the resilience index tends to 100 if all the
proofs were correctly recovered, otherwise it goes to 0. The
plot shows that with the increases of the overlays, the resilience
index tends to reach 100 even in presence of an high drop rate.
More precisely, we manage to recover 99.7% of the proofs with
8 overlays. Overall, the resilience index stays above 97.2% by
using only 4 overlays with a drop rate of 20%.
This experiment shows that the overlays can be effectively
used to recover the network in the presence of attacks, even
though the network is small.
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E. Security Consideration
We describe how SAFEd reacts against different attacker
scenarios.
Tampered Devices: An attacker may infect a device
and take control of it. Since we use a trusted anchor, we
consider the secure world as protected, while the normal world
can be under attacker control. Therefore, SAFEd protocol is
protected by design. Moreover, all the packets that transit
through the normal world are encrypted, thus outside the
attacker range. However, an attacker may avoid invoking
trusted anchor code by compromising normal world scheduler.
We mitigate this problem by adopting a blind scheduling
(Section VI) that avoids an attacker to disable a specific SAFEd
operation (e.g., attestation) without stopping the entire device,
thus being detected.
To test SAFEd effectiveness, we verified that the other
devices are able to spot the modified code inside the normal
world.
Attacks against the Network: All the messages ex-
changed among trusted anchors are encrypted (Section V-B)
and only devices that joined the network can communicate
among each other (Section V-D). Man-in-the-middle [9] at-
tacks are mitigated by design: (i) the body is protected by the
symmetric key KAB , (ii) the header can be manipulated only
by the trusted anchors of authorized devices. We also include
nonces to avoid replay attacks. This enhances robustness even
in case of corrupted devices as long as their trusted anchor
remains intact.
Physical attacks: According to DARPA attacker
model [20], a device which receives a physical attack is
temporarily removed from the network. Previous authors [20],
[21], [22] proposed to use a heartbeat to keep the devices
synchronized. In this way, a device that goes temporarily
off-line cannot get aligned with the heartbeat, and therefore,
enabling the detection of the attack. However, establishing a
heartbeat protocol implies the presence of loosely synchro-
nized and secure clocks in every device. SAFEd overcomes
this requirement by using the communication timeouts and
nonces to detect network disconnections. During the protocol
execution, each device periodically contacts its successor to
assess its status. In case a timeout occurs, the device uses the
successor list to contact the closest node following the old
one. The contacted device will further check if its predecessor
left the network, and if so, it will acquire the message sender
as new predecessor, while launching an alert for a possible
physical attack. The double check adds robustness against sim-
ple network malfunctions. To enhance the protection against
physical attacks, we further propose a certificate revocation
strategy that will be discussed in Section VIII.
Denial-of-Service: We do not protect against denial-
of-service in case of an entire compromised network (e.g., all
the messages are dropped). However, we can recover partial
information loss by combining multiple overlays and our
attestation protocol (Section VII-D).
VIII. DISCUSSION
We discuss some aspects of SAFEd that can be further
developed or improved as future works.
Certificate Revocation: SAFEd security properties can
be further improved by adopting an efficient certificate revo-
cation mechanism. This feature can be useful in at least three
scenarios: (i) if the CA private key gets compromised (e.g.,
leaked), (ii) if a software is updated and (iii) if a device is
corrupted. The design of a scalable and efficient certificate
revocation procedure was already addressed by [18], [28] that
proposed solutions based on Bloom filters [11]. Furthermore,
[5] proposed a way to make a Bloom filter scalable, i.e.,
to make its capacity adaptable at runtime so that it can be
increased without stopping the general execution. It is possible
to implement in SAFEd a certificate revocation protocol that
is scalable and distributed based on the previous citations.
Run-time Attacks: An attacker could alter the applica-
tion behavior without modifying the binary by using run-time
attacks [12]. A way to cope with those threats is using run-time
remote attestation [38], [1] that can verify run-time properties,
e.g., the current execution path. Usually, these solutions require
several proofs to be stored. We can use the DHTs in SAFEd
to spread the proof load among devices. We leave this as a
future work.
Run-time Software Upgrade: In specific cases (e.g.,
industrial IoT), we need to upgrade devices software without
interrupting the network. In SAFEd, we do not deal with
this case, but it is possible to mitigate this issue by using
two main approaches: (i) we could introduce new upgraded
devices in the network and remove the old ones until all
the network is upgraded, (ii) we integrate specific upgrade
protocols in SAFEd that load new software and substitute
the proofs in the DHTs. Regardless the strategy adopted, the
software upgrade strategy should be integrated with a strong
certificate revocation mechanisms to avoid an attacker to re-
upload old and vulnerable software.
IX. CONCLUSION
In this work, we proposed SAFEd, the first concrete self-
attestation for networks of heterogeneous embedded devices.
SAFEd maintains multiple copies of the proofs among the
devices, which are equipped with small trusted anchors. We
also designed and developed new techniques that enhance
classic DHT protocols against powerful adversaries, which are
typical of remote attestation scenarios.
SAFEd allows performing remote attestations without the
need of a powerful Verifier, and consequently removing a
single point of failure. SAFEd coordinates multiple devices to
self-protect the network and also to self-recover in presence of
attackers and faults. These properties are achieved in a scalable
manner introducing a logarithmic network traffic and device
memory footprint.
We implemented a prototype of SAFEd in the open-
source platform Raspberry Pi 3, allowing us to show the
technical challenges faced to implement SAFEd in the ARM
TrustZone architecture. Moreover, we performed a large scale
measurement by using a virtual network of Docker containers.
As a result, we showed the feasibility of our approach in terms
of performances and security guarantees.
We think SAFEd will help researchers and companies
develop more autonomous and secure IoT network.
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